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Abstract—We demonstrate the presence of a novel sched-
uler side-channel in preemptive, fixed-priority real-time systems
(RTS); examples of such systems can be found in automotive
systems, avionic systems, power plants and industrial control
systems among others. This side-channel can leak important
timing information such as the future arrival times of real-
time tasks. This information can then be used to launch dev-
astating attacks, two of which are demonstrated here (on real
hardware platforms). Note that it is not easy to capture this
timing information due to runtime variations in the schedules,
the presence of multiple other tasks in the system and the
typical constraints (e.g., deadlines) in the design of RTS. Our
ScheduLeak algorithms demonstrate how to effectively exploit
this side-channel. A complete implementation is presented on real
operating systems (in Real-time Linux and FreeRTOS). Timing
information leaked by ScheduLeak can significantly aid other,
more advanced, attacks in better accomplishing their goals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the scenario where an adversary wants to attack an
embedded real-time system (RTS) – parts of autonomous cars,
industrial robots, anti-lock braking systems in modern cars,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), power grid components,
the NASA rovers, implanted medical devices, etc. These
systems typically have limited memory and processing power,
have very regimented designs (stringent timing constraints for
instance) and any unexpected actions can be quickly thwarted.
Therefore, the opportunity to either steal a critical piece of
information or the ability to launch that attack which takes
control of the system can be very limited. As a consequence,
attacks on such systems require significant system specific
information. This “information” can take many forms – from
an understanding of the design of the system, to knowledge
of the critical components (either software or hardware). The
exact knowledge depends on the type of attack and the
target component. For example, say, (a) to steal important
information about when (and where) an on-board camera is
used for reconnaissance or (b) to take control away from the
ground operator of a remotely-controlled vehicle.
The one common underlying theme that pervades real-time
systems (and something that a would-be attacker should defi-
nitely address) is the importance of timing. “Timing” includes:
(i) when certain events occur, (ii) how often they occur, and,
most importantly for this paper, (iii) when (and if) they will
occur again in the future. In fact, a number of critical software
components in real-time systems are periodic in nature. As
we shall see, these periodic tasks present themselves as prime
targets for attackers.
So, how does one attack such systems, especially the
periodic (and critical) components1?
We have discovered the presence of a scheduler-based
side-channel that leaks timing information in real-time
systems – in particular those with fixed priority tasks.
The scheduler-based side-channel enables an unprivileged,
low-priority task to learn the precise timing behavior of the
critical, periodic (victim) task(s) by simply observing its own
execution intervals using a system timer. This provides an
attacker with the ability to infer the initial offset of the victim
task and precisely predict its future arrival times at runtime2.
We name the algorithms that exploit this side-channel attack,
“ScheduLeak”.
Figure 1 presents an overview of the side-channel and also
how the attacker can benefit from the scheduler side-channel-
based information. The left side of the figure shows how a
real-time system consisting of fixed-priority tasks (the boxes
at the top – the victim is a periodic task while all other
tasks can be either periodic or sporadic) that results in a
schedule (dotted boxes in the middle, with each task being
indistinguishable from the other at runtime) can be analyzed to
extract the precise future arrival time points (the green, upward
arrows) of the victim task. The right-hand side of the figure
shows how this timing information of the critical task can be
used to launch other attacks that either leak more important
information or destabilize the real-time control system. Note
that without this precise timing information, an attacker is
either forced to guess when the victim task(s) will execute or
launch the attacks at random points in time – both of which
dilute the efficacy of the attack or result in early termination
of the system.
The extraction of this runtime timing information is non-
trivial; main reasons include (a) the runtime schedule depends
heavily on the state of the system at startup, initialization vari-
ables and environmental conditions and (b) real-time systems
typically include multiple non-real-time tasks as well. Even
precise knowledge of all statically-known system parameters
is insufficient to reconstruct the future arrival times of the
1We shall see potential end results of such attacks in Section VI.
2In this paper, we do not focus on inferences of other task timing behaviors
such as job start times or job completion times.
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Figure 1: Overview of paper: We demonstrate how an unprivileged, low-priority task (in user space) can use the ScheduLeak
algorithms to infer execution behaviors of critical, high-priority periodic task(s). The extracted information is useful for helping
other attacks achieve their primary goals (two such attack instances are implemented in this paper as possible use cases).
victim. While a privileged attacker could target the scheduler
of the system and extract the requisite information, such
access typically requires significant effort and/or resources.
On the other hand, we are able to reconstruct the information
with the same level of precision using an unprivileged user
space application. This is achieved by letting the attacker’s
application keep track of its own scheduling information.
Coupled with some easily obtainable information about the
system (e.g., the victim task’s period), the attacker can recreate
the targeting timing information with high precision.
To be more specific, let’s say that we want to override the
(remote) control of a rover. In many such systems, a periodic
pulse width modulation (PWM) task drives the steering and
throttle. Without knowledge of when the PWM task is likely
to update the motor control values, the attacker is forced
to employ brute force or random strategies to override the
PWM values. These could either end up being ineffective
or lead to the entire system being reset before the attack
succeeds (see Section VI for more details on this and another
scenario). Armed with knowledge from ScheduLeak, our
smart adversary can now override the PWM values right after
they have been written by the corresponding task – effectively
overriding the actuation commands.
Scheduler covert channels, where two processes covertly
communicate using the scheduler, have long been known
(e.g., [1], [2], [3]). In contrast, our focus is on a side-channel
that leaks execution timing behavior (not deliberately, as
opposed to the scheduler covert channels) of critical, high-
priority real-time tasks to unprivileged, low-priority tasks.
We focus on uniprocessor (i.e., single-core) systems with
a preemptive, fixed-priority real-time task scheduler [4], [5]
since they are the most common class of real-time systems
deployed in practice today [6]. It is important for an attacker
to stay within the strict execution time budgets allotted to the
unprivileged task – especially during the phases when it is
trying to observe and reconstruct the victim’s timing behavior.
Failing this requirement will likely cause other critical real-
time functionality to fail or trigger a watchdog timeout that
resets the system, leading to premature ejection of the attacker.
This property is crucial during the ‘reconnaissance’ phase of
what has come to be known as advanced persistent threat
(APT) attacks [7], [8]. E.g., it has been reported that attackers
had penetrated and stayed resident undetected in the system
for months before they initiated the actual attack in the case of
Stuxnet [9]. Once they had enough information about system
internals, they were able to craft effective attacks tailored to
that particular system.
The ScheduLeak algorithms are implemented on both:
(a) real hardware platforms running Real-Time Linux and
FreeRTOS (for the two attack case studies) and (b) a simulator.
We evaluate the performance and scalability of ScheduLeak
in Section VII, along with a design space exploration (on the
simulator). The results show that our methods are effective
at reconstructing schedule information and provide valuable
information for later attacks to better accomplish their attack
goals. To summarize, the main contributions are:
1) Novel scheduler side-channel attack algorithms that can
accurately reconstruct the initial offsets and predict future
arrival times of critical real-time tasks in real-time systems
(without requiring privileged access) [Section III]
2) Analyses and metrics to measure the accuracy in predict-
ing the execution and timing properties of the victim tasks
[Sections IV and VII].
3) Implementation and case studies on real hardware plat-
forms (i.e., autonomous systems) running Real-time Linux
and FreeRTOS [Section VI].
II. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
A. Time Model
We assume that the attacker has access to a system timer on
the target system and therefore time measured by the attacker
has the resolution equal3 to this system timer. The timer can
3Section VI-A demonstrates a case that the attacker may use a coarser time
resolution and the proposed attack algorithms would still work.
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Table I: A summary of the system and adversary model.
Real-Time System Assumptions
A1 A preemptive, fixed-priority real-time scheduler is used.
A2 The victim task is a periodic task.
Attacker’s Capabilities (Requirements)
R1 The attacker has the control of one user-space task (observer
task) that has a lower priority than the victim task.
R2 The attacker has knowledge of the victim task’s period.
R3 The attacker has access to a system timer on the system.
Attacker’s Goals
G1 Infer the victim task’s initial offset and predict future arrivals.
be either a software or a hardware timer (e.g., a 64-bit Global
Timer in FreeRTOS or a CLOCK MONOTONIC-based timer in
Linux). We consider a discrete time model [10]. We assume
that a unit of time equals a timer tick (of the timer that the
attacker can access) and the tick count is an integer. All system
and task parameters are multiples of a time tick. We denote
an interval starting from time point a and ending at time point
b that has a length of b− a by [a, b) or [a, b− 1].
B. System Model
We consider a uniprocessor (i.e., single-core), fixed-priority,
preemptive real-time system consisting of n real-time tasks
Γ = {τ1, ...τn}. A task can be either a periodic or a sporadic
task. Each task τi is characterized by (pi, di, ei, ai, prii) where
pi is the period (or the minimum inter-arrival time), di is the
relative deadline, ei is the worst-case execution time (WCET),
ai is the initial task offset (i.e., the arrival time) and prii is
the priority. We assume that every task has a distinct period4
and that a task’s deadline is equal to its period [5]. We use
the same symbol τi to represent a task’s job (or instance) for
simplicity of notation. We assume that task release jitter is
negligible. Thus, any two adjacent arrivals of a periodic task
τi has a constant distance pi. We further assume that each task
is assigned a distinct priority and that the taskset is schedulable
by a fixed-priority, preemptive real-time scheduler. Let hp(τi)
denote the set of tasks that have higher priorities than that of
τi and lp(τi) denote the set of tasks that have lower priorities
than τi. We define an “execution interval” of a task to be an
interval of time [a, b) during which the task runs continuously.
If τi is preempted then the execution will be partitioned into
multiple execution intervals, each of which has length less than
ei.
C. Adversary Model
We assume that an attacker is interested in targeting one
of the critical tasks in the system that we henceforth refer
to as a “victim task”, denoted by τv ∈ Γ. We also assume
that τv is a real-time, periodic task. Many critical functions in
real-time control systems are periodic in nature, e.g., the code
that controlled the frequency of the slave variable-frequency
drives in the Stuxnet example [9]. In all such cases, the period
4This assumption is in line with existing standards in the design of real-
time tasks to ensure distinct periods/priorities. For example, AUTOSAR (a
standardized automotive software architecture) tools map runnables/functions
activated by the same period to a single task to reduce context switch/pre-
emption overheads.
of the task is strictly related to the characteristics of the
physical system and thereby can be deduced from the physical
properties; hence, we can assume that the attacker is able to
gain knowledge of the victim task’s period beforehand. It is
common that, before attacking complex systems (e.g., CPS),
adversaries will study the design and details of such systems.
However, the attacker does not know the initial conditions at
system start-up (e.g., the task’s initial offset) and may not have
information on all the tasks in the system. All other tasks in
the system can be either periodic, sporadic or non-real-time,
depending on the design of the system. Hence, the methods
developed in this paper can target systems that have a mix of
periodic, sporadic and non-real-time tasks.
The ultimate goal varies with adversaries and the systems
under attack. For example, in advanced persistent threat (APT)
attacks [7], [8], one may plan to interfere with the operations of
critical tasks, eavesdrop upon certain information via shared
resources or even carry out debilitating attacks at a critical
juncture when the victim system is most vulnerable. Often-
times, such attacks require the attacker to precisely gauge the
timing properties of victim tasks. In this paper, we introduce
attack algorithms that help an attacker obtain this valuable
information during the reconnaissance stage. In this context,
the main goal of the attacker is to precisely infer when the
victim task is scheduled to run in the near future (i.e., the
future arrival times).
Note that our focus in this paper is on how to reconstruct
the timing behavior of a higher-priority periodic victim task
using the scheduler side-channel without violating the real-
time constraints. We do this from the vantage point of a
compromised, lower-priority (“observer”) task. We do not
focus on how attackers get access to the observer task. They
could use any number of known methods – from compromised
insiders, to supply chain vulnerabilities in a multi-vendor
development model (as is usually practiced for the design
and development of large, complex systems such as aircraft,
automobiles, industrial control systems, etc.) [11], to vulner-
abilities in the software and network among others. Recent
work has demonstrated that real-time systems like commercial
drones contain design flaws and hence are vulnerable to
compromise [12], [13]. The details of gaining access to an
observer task are out of scope for this paper. Nevertheless, it
is important to note that we do not require the observer task to
be a privileged task in the system. A summary of assumptions,
attacker’s capabilities and goals is given in Table I.
D. Observer Task
As previously mentioned, we refer to the lower-priority
task that the attacker controls as an “observer task” and it
is denoted by τo ∈ Γ. It can be a user-space task. The only
constraint we place on τo is that it has a lower priority than
the victim task, priv > prio. The observer task can be either
a periodic or a sporadic task and its period (or its minimum
inter-arrival time) can be shorter or longer than the victim
task. In particular, being a periodic task is a more restrictive
condition since it reduces the flexibility available to an attacker
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(this will be clearer as we introduce the algorithms). That is,
the case where a periodic observer task with a period po and
priority prio can succeed, a sporadic observer task (by picking
the same po as the minimum inter-arrival time and the same
priority prio) can also succeed. Therefore, when analyzing the
attack capabilities in Section IV, we will consider a periodic
observer task (or a sporadic observer task running at a constant
inter-arrival time).
In this paper, we use the observer task to infer the initial
offset av that can be used to predict future arrivals of the
victim task. We let the observer task “monitor” its own
execution intervals by using a system timer. Note that reading
system time does not require privilege in most operating
systems (e.g., invoking clock gettime() in Linux). The key
idea here is that the intervals when the observer task is active
cannot contain the victim task’s execution or its arrival time
point since the victim would have preempted the observer task.
However, there are also other higher-priority tasks that can
impact the observer task’s execution behaviors. To the attacker,
the challenge is to then filter out unnecessary information and
extract the correct information about the victim task. This is
explained in the following section.
III. SCHEDULEAK
A. Overview
We now introduce the core algorithms. The main idea is that
the victim task cannot run while the observer task is running
since the latter has a lower priority. By reconstructing the
observer task’s own execution intervals and analyzing those
intervals based on the victim task’s period, we may infer
the initial offset and future arrival times for the victim task.
A high-level overview of the various analyses stages in our
proposed ScheduLeak algorithms includes:
1) Reconstruct execution intervals of the observer task: first,
the observer task uses a system timer to measure and
reconstruct its own execution intervals (i.e., times when it
itself is active). [Section III-B]
2) Analyze the execution intervals: The reconstructed ex-
ecution intervals are organized in a “schedule ladder
diagram” – a timeline that is divided into windows that
match the period of the victim task. [Section III-C]
3) Infer the victim task’s initial offset and future arrivals:
in the final step, the initial offset for the victim task is
inferred. This information is then used to predict the future
arrivals of the victim. Since the victim task is periodic
in nature, the offset from the start of its own window
translates to the offset from startup when the first instance
of the victim task executed. [Section III-D]
B. Reconstruction of Execution Intervals
The first step is to reconstruct the observer task’s execution
intervals. We implement a function in the observer task that
keeps track of time read from the system timer. By examining
the polled time stamps, preemptions (if any) can be identified
and the execution intervals of the observer task can be recon-
structed. While this function seems straightforward, ensuring
that it respects real-time constraints (i.e., all real-time tasks
must meet their deadlines) is critical. That is, the observer task
should not run more than its WCET, eo. Furthermore, even if
the attacker does not exceed the allocated execution budget
for itself, it may want to save some budget for other purposes
such as performing the analyses to reconstruct the timing
information of the victim. Hence, we define a parameter, λ,
whose value is set by the attacker, to limit the running time
of the aforementioned function for the observer task in each
period. This “maximum reconstruction time”, λ, is an integer
in the range 0 ≤ λ ≤ eo. The total length of the reconstructed
execution intervals is λ in each period and this leaves the
timespan eo − λ for the observer task to carry out other
computations. As a result, the service levels guaranteed by
the original (clean) system is still maintained – thus reducing
the risk of triggering system errors. On the flip side, the
attacker may not be able to capture all possible execution
intervals and this could reduce the fidelity/precision of the final
results. Section IV-B discusses how to compute good values
for λ. Figure 2 shows examples of reconstructed execution
intervals. The function for reconstructing an execution interval
of the observer task while taking λ into account is detailed in
Appendix-A as Algorithm 1.
C. Analysis of Execution Intervals
Once the observer task’s execution intervals are recon-
structed, we analyze the data to extract information about the
victim task. We organize the observer’s execution intervals
into a timeline split into lengths of the victim task’s period pv
(recall that pv is one of the known quantities for the attacker).
The purpose of this step is to place the execution intervals of
the observer task within periodic windows of the victim task.
The timeline split into windows of length that matches the
victim task’s period allows the attacker to see how the observer
task’s execution intervals are influenced by the victim task as
well as other higher-priority tasks.
To better illustrate the idea of the timeline and the proposed
algorithms, we will use a “schedule ladder diagram” (defined
below) to represent the construction of the timeline in this
paper. The rows in the schedule ladder diagram can be merged
into a single-line timeline (and is just an analytical “trick”).
A schedule ladder diagram is a skeleton consisting of a set
of adjacent timelines of equal lengths – that match the victim
task’s period pv . The start time of the top section can be an
arbitrary point in time assigned by the attacker (e.g., the time
instant when the algorithms are first invoked). The columns
in the schedule ladder diagram are “unit time columns”.
So, there are pv time columns. That is, the schedule ladder
diagram has the same time resolution as the reconstructed
execution intervals. The skeleton of a schedule ladder diagram
is illustrated in Figure 3. From the diagram, plotted based on
pv , we make the following observation:
Observation 1. Any schedule ladder diagram of τv must
contain exactly one arrival instance of τv in every row. All
arrivals of τv are located in the same time column.
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Figure 4: The processed schedule lad-
der diagram for Example 1.
This observation is true because τv is a periodic task that
arrives every pv time units and the schedule ladder diagram
is plotted with its interval equal to pv . We define the column
where the arrivals of the victim task are located as the “true
arrival column”, denoted by δv . Thus, the correlation between
the initial offset av and the true arrival column δv can be
derived by (t+ δv − av) mod pv = 0, where t represents the
(arbitrary) start time of the schedule ladder diagram assigned
by the attacker. This is also depicted in Figure 3. Based on this
observation, we define the following theorem with respect to
the observer task’s executions on the schedule ladder diagram:
Theorem 1. The observer task’s execution intervals do not
appear at the time columns [δv, δv + bcetv), where bcetv is
the best case execution time of τv .
Proof. From Observation 1, the victim task τv arrives regularly
at time column δv . If there exists lower priority tasks lp(τv)
in execution at δv column, the victim task preempts such tasks
until it finishes its job with length of bectv at a minimum. In
the case that there exists higher priority tasks hp(τv) that are
executing or arriving during [δv, δv+bcetv), the victim task τv
is preempted. Under this circumstance, if the observer task τo
had arrived during [δv, δv + bcetv), as a lower priority task, it
is also preempted. Therefore, the time columns [δv, δv+bcetv)
cannot contain the execution intervals of the observer task. 
In other words, the time columns where the observer task
τo can ever appear are not the true arrival column δv . To
this end, it’s easier to think of the problem as the process of
eliminating those such time columns. If we place the obtained
execution intervals of τo on the schedule ladder diagram and
remove the corresponding time columns, then, there must
exist at least an interval of continuous time columns, of
which the length is equal to or greater than bcetv , that is
not removed in the end. Those time columns are candidates
for the true arrival time of τv . There may also exist time
columns that are not removed due to other higher-priority
tasks. Yet, since other tasks have distinct arrival periods (or
random arrivals for sporadic tasks), those time columns tend
to be scattered (compared to [δv, δv+bcetv)) and are expected
to be eliminated as more execution intervals of the observer
task are collected. In practice, our results indicate that this
process works effectively and is mostly stabilized after an
attack duration of 5 · LCM(po, pv) (see Section VII-B1).
Example 1. Consider an RTS consisting of four tasks Γ =
{τ1, τo, τv, τ4}. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all
tasks are periodic in this example (though our analysis can
work with periodic, sporadic and mixed systems as well). The
task parameters are presented in the table below (on the left).
Note that prii > prij means that τi has a higher number than
τj . Thus, task τ1 has the lowest priority while task τ4 has the
highest priority and τv has higher priority than τo. Let the
maximum reconstruction duration λ be 1 and the start time
of the attack be 0 (as a result, av equals δv in this example).
Assuming the attacker has executed the first step/algorithm for
some duration, the table below lists the reconstructed execution
intervals of the observer task.
pi ei ai prii
τ1 15 1 3 1
τo 10 2 0 2
τv 8 2 1 3
τ4 6 1 4 4
Reconstructed
Execution Intervals
[0,1)
[12,13)
[20,21)
[30,31)
[43,44)
Note that since τ1 has priority lower than the observer task
τo, it does not influence the execution of τo. Then, we place the
reconstructed execution intervals in a schedule ladder diagram
of width equal to the victim task’s period pv . This operation
is shown in Figure 4. To better understand the effectiveness
of the schedule ladder diagram in profiling the victim task’s
behavior, we plot the original, complete, schedule on the ladder
diagram in Figure 12 in Appendix so that readers get a better
sense of it. This gives us an insight into the relation between
the execution intervals of τo and that of the victim task.
From the schedule ladder diagram in Figure 4, we remove
the time columns that are occupied by the observed execution
intervals. The results are shown at the bottom of Figure
4. What’s left are candidate time columns that contain the
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true arrival times for the victim that we want to extract.
These intervals are passed to the final step to infer the initial
offset/arrival times of the victim task. 
D. Inference of Initial Offset and Future Arrival Instants
We now get to the final step – inferring the future arrival
instants of the victim task – our original objective. But, first,
we need to calculate the initial offset of the victim task.
What we get from the previous step is a set of intervals of
candidate time columns that contains the true arrival column
of the victim task. The number of intervals depends on the
number of collected execution intervals as well as the “noise”
introduced by other, higher-priority, tasks (hence, there is no
guarantee that all false time columns can be eliminated in the
end). However, as observed from our experiments and based
on Theorem 1, the false time columns tend to be scattered.
Therefore, we take the largest interval as our inference that
may contain the true arrival column of the victim task. We then
pick the start of this interval as the inferred true arrival column,
denoted by δˆv . While this strategy is not always guaranteed to
succeed, our evaluation (both case studies in Section VI and
performance evaluation in Section VII) shows that we are able
to achieve a high degree of precision for the inference. The
required initial offset, denoted by aˆv , can then be derived as
aˆv = (t+ δˆv) mod pv , where t represents the start time of the
schedule ladder diagram.
Example 2. The intervals obtained from Example 1 corre-
spond to the time columns [1, 3), [5, 6) and [7, 8). According to
the algorithm, the largest interval, [1, 3), is selected. The start-
ing point of such an interval is then taken as the inference of
the victim task’s true arrival column, which becomes δˆv = 1.
In this example, the true arrival column is δv = 1. Therefore,
the algorithms correctly infer the true arrival column of the
victim task and the initial offset can be derived accordingly.
Now, the future arrivals of the victim task can easily be
computed by aˆv + pv · T , T ∈ N, where aˆv is the inferred
initial offset of τv , pv is the period of τv and T is the desired
arrival number. The result of this calculation is the exact time
of the T th arrival of the victim task.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS
A. Analyzing Attack Capability
We now discuss how to determine the attack capability or
effectiveness of the observer task with respect to the victim
task. That is, in this context, whether the observer task can
remove all false time columns, and hence, correctly infer the
arrival information of the victim task. Note that the analysis
presented in this section focuses on the observer task being
a periodic task since, as we mentioned in Section II-D, it is
a more restrictive condition to an attacker. Given the same
target system, a sporadic observer task may perform better as
the sporadic task naturally has more flexible arrivals that are
constrained only by its minimum inter-arrival time.
A conservative condition ensuring that all false time
columns can be removed from the schedule ladder diagram of
τv is: when the observer task’s execution intervals appear in
all possible time columns. Therefore, we first analyze how the
observer task’s execution relates to the victim task’s execution.
When considering both τv and τo as periodic tasks, we have
the following observation and theorem:
Observation 2. In the schedule ladder diagram, the offset
between the time column of each observer task’s arrival (i.e.,
the scheduled execution) and the true arrival column repeats
after their least common multiple, LCM(po, pv). 
Theorem 2. If the given observer task τo and the victim
task τv satisfy the inequality eo ≥ GCD(po, pv), then the
scheduled execution of τo is guaranteed to appear in all time
columns of the schedule ladder diagram of τv .
Proof. From Observation 2, the time column offset of the ob-
server task’s execution repeats every LCM(po, pv). Therefore,
the aforementioned condition (i.e., the scheduled execution of
τo appears in all possible time columns) can be described
by the inequality LCM(po,pv)po · eo ≥ pv . Then, by using
LCM(po, pv) =
popv
GCD(po,pv)
, we can derive a condition for
eo that guarantees that the observer task can detect the arrivals
of the victim task to be eo ≥ GCD(po, pv). 
From Theorem 2, we find that the observer task’s scheduled
execution can appear in some of the time columns more than
once during LCM(po, pv) when eo > GCD(po, pv). The
redundant coverage means that the false time columns will
be visited by τo more frequently when compared to the lower
ratio of eo to GCD(po, pv). In contrast, if eo < GCD(po, pv),
then not all the false time columns can be covered and
examined by the observer task. To better profile the observer
task’s coverage, we further define a coverage ratio that depicts
the observer task’s capability against the victim task as follows
Definition 1. (Coverage Ratio) The coverage ratio, denoted
by C(τo, τv), is computed by
C(τo, τv) =
eo
GCD(po, pv)
(1)
The coverage ratio can be loosely interpreted as the pro-
portion of the time columns where the observer task can
potentially appear in the schedule ladder diagram. If all pv
time columns can be covered by the observer task, then
C(τo, τv) ≥ 1. Otherwise 0 ≤ C(τo, τv) < 1.
B. Choosing The Maximum Reconstruction Duration λ
Recall that, the maximum reconstruction duration λ is used
to limit the amount of execution time (in a period) taken up
by the observer task for running the attack algorithms. As the
attacker wants to stay stealthy and minimize disruption to the
original functionality, it is desirable to use a λ value as small
as possible. The remaining execution time eo − λ can then
be used by the attacker to deliver the original functionality of
τo while making progress on the capturing of execution data.
Based on this idea, λ can be determined by:
λ =
{
GCD(po, pv) if C(τo, τv) ≥ 1
eo otherwise
(2)
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Figure 5: An illustration of PWM channels on a rover system. (a) The PWM outputs are updated periodically by a 50Hz
task. (b) A naive attack issuing the PWM updates at random instants may not be effective. (c) By carefully issuing the PWM
updates right after the original updates, the PWM outputs can be overridden.
In the case of C(τo, τv) ≥ 1, the observer task has
redundant coverage. Since a one-time coverage is sufficient
for the observer task to examine all pv time columns, the
additional coverage can be traded for other purposes. Oth-
erwise (C(τo, τv) < 1), the attacker may need to utilize all its
computational resource for the attack.
V. EVALUATION METRICS
To evaluate ScheduLeak, we define the following two metrics:
(i) Inference Success Rate: We define an inference to be
successful if attacker is able to exactly infer the victim task’s
initial offset (recall from Section III-D that once we know the
initial offset, we can easily predict the future arrival instants).
Therefore, the result of an inference is either true or false. The
inference success rate is an average of the true/false results
for a given test condition for a set of task sets.
(ii) Inference Precision Ratio: In the case that the inference
is not exact, we define a metric to evaluate the degree of
the inference precision (i.e., how close we got to the actual
values). In this paper, the inference target is the initial offset
of the victim task. We first compute the distance between the
inference and the true value by  = |aˆv − av| , where av is
the initial offset of the victim task and aˆv is the inferred initial
offset. We then define the inference precision ratio:
Definition 2. (Inference Precision Ratio) The inference pre-
cision ratio, denoted by Iov , is computed by
Iov =
1−
pv−
pv
2
if  > pv2
1− pv
2
otherwise
(3)
The inference precision ratio is a real number within 0 ≤ Iov ≤
1. It allows us to know how close the inference is to the true
initial offset. Iov = 1 indicates that the inference of the initial
offset av is absolutely correct.
VI. EVALUATION USING CASE STUDIES
ON REAL PLATFORMS
Before evaluating performance of the introduced algorithms,
we first aim to evaluate the feasibility of such algorithms
on realistic platforms in this section. The ScheduLeak al-
gorithms are implemented on two operating systems with
a real-time scheduling capability: (i) Real-Time Linux [14]
and (ii) FreeRTOS [15]. In what follows, two attack cases
are presented. They benefit from the information obtained
by the proposed algorithms and utilize such information to
accomplish their primary attack goals. The demo videos for
these attack cases can be found at https://scheduleak.github.io/.
A. Overriding Control Signals
Attack Scenario and Objective: A large number of real-time
control systems encapsulate subsystems that control actuators.
For instance, in modern automotive systems, the engine control
unit (ECU) controls the valve in the electronic throttle body
(ETB) to enable electronic throttle control (ETC). In most
unmanned drones, the flight controller manages the rotary
speed of the motors via the electronic speed controller (ESC).
In these systems, the actuation signals such as PWM signals
are periodically updated to guarantee a fast and consistent
response for the control mission.
Let’s consider an attacker who wants to be able to stealthily
override the control in such systems – for the purpose of
bad control by causing misbehavior or even taking over the
control of the system for a short time span. To do so, the
attacker gets into the system as a malicious task and tries
to override the control signals. A brute force strategy of
excessively overriding the control signals will not work in this
scenario because its high attack overhead can cause other real-
time tasks to miss their deadlines and lead to a system crash. In
this case, knowledge of exact timing when the control signals
are updated and overriding them at the right instants allow the
attacker to effectively take control with a low overhead.
Implementation: We implement this attack on a custom rover.
Its control system is built with a Raspberry Pi 3 Model
B board. A Navio2 module board that encapsulates various
inertial sensors is attached to the Raspberry Pi board. The sys-
tem runs Real-Time Linux (i.e., Raspbian, kernel 4.9.45 with
PREEMPT RT patch) with Ardupilot [16] autopilot software
suite (one of the most popular open-source code stack in the
remote and autonomous control communities). It consists of a
set of real-time and non-real-time tasks to perform control-
related jobs such as refreshing GPS coordinates, decoding
remote control commands, performing PID calculation and
updating output signals. One of the tasks periodically updates
the PWM values, with a period of 20ms, for steering and
throttle. The updates are sent over Serial Peripheral Interface
(SPI) to the Navio2 module that outputs the PWM signals to
a servo and a ESC. Figure 5(a) shows an illustration of the
PWM output channels working under normal circumstances.
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Figure 6: Results of the cache-timing side-channel attacks in Section VI-B. (a) demonstrates that a random mechanism launching
the attack at arbitrary instants will lead to many indistinguishable cache usage results. (b) shows a successful attack in which
four camera activation events (numbered by 1 to 4) are identified from the cache probes using precise time information
(inferred by ScheduLeak). (c) visualizes the UAV’s trajectory (bold line), true locations-of-interest (green circles) and the
attacker’s inference (red pins) for the attack (b). The result shows that the attacker’s inference matches the ground truth.
In this attack, we assume that the attacker has access to a
low-priority, periodic task (as the observer task, po = 50ms)
and a non-real-time Linux process (for launching the PWM
overriding attack). The attacker’s ultimate objective is to
override the control signals updated by the victim task (i.e., the
50Hz periodic task). In this implementation, the observer task
uses a system call, clock gettime(), to obtain clock counts
(in nanoseconds) from CLOCK MONOTONIC. Time measurement
is further rounded up to microseconds when running the
ScheduLeak algorithms since all task parameters are multiples
of 1us in Ardupilot. Once the victim task’s initial offset is
determined, the attacker engages the non-real-time process
to issue the PWM updates over the same interface that the
victim task uses. Note that this is possible due to a lack
of authentication between the Raspberry Pi board and the
Navio2 module by design. This process keeps track of time
by using clock gettime() and issues two PWM updates
(one for the steering and one for the throttle) whenever it
determines that it has passed a victim task’s arrival instant
(i.e., t− aˆv mod pv ≥ 0, where t is the present time and aˆv is
the inferred victim task’s initial offset). The process remains
idle between two PWM updates to reduce the attack footprint.
Attack Results: Figures 5(b) and 5(c) show that the PWM
output may be overridden using a different value to the
PWM hardware. However, without exact schedule information,
the attacker can only periodically send the updates with a
randomly selected initial offset (Figure 5(b)). The random
initial offset can be any point in the 20ms period. From our
experiments, only the attack with an initial offset in the range
between av and av + 8.3ms can produce an effective override
of the steering and throttle controls. As a result, the attacker
has a chance of 41.5% to select a valid initial offset and lead
to an effective attack.
On the other hand, the attacker, after launching the Sched-
uLeak attack and knowing exactly when the victim task ar-
rives, can carefully issue PWM update right after the original
update to override the PWM output (Figure 5(c)). In this
case, the attacker firstly runs the ScheduLeak algorithms in the
observer task, yielding 0.9985 for the inference precision ratio
(for inferring the victim task’s initial offset) in a duration of 1
second. This allows the attacker to launch the PWM overriding
attack in the non-real-time process with the precise inference
of the victim task’s initial offset. Note that an attacker’s PWM
update attempted at a victim task’s arrival instant is executed
after the victim task’s job is finished (and hence after the
original PWM update) since the non-real-time process has a
priority lower than the victim task. Consequently, the attacker
can take over control of the steering and throttle. By probing
the PWM signals, we observe that the overridden PWM signals
are active 85% of the time. As a result, we see that the rover
no longer responds to the original control. Instead, the rover is
driven by the attacker’s commands. Since the attacker’s task
remains idle between two PWM updates, it takes up CPU
utilization as small as 2.6%.
B. Inferring System Behaviors
Attack Scenario and Objective: Let’s consider a UAV system
executing a surveillance mission. It captures high resolution
images when flying over locations of high-interest. In this
case, the attacker’s goal is to extract the locations targeted
by the UAV. The strategy is to monitor when the surveillance
camera on the UAV is switched to a execution mode in which
high-resolution images are being processed. This can be done
by exploiting a cache-timing side-channel attack to gauge the
coarse-grained memory usage behavior of the task that handles
the images. A high cache usage by this task would indicate
that a high-resolution image is being processed; otherwise it
would use less cache memory. However, a random sampling
of the cache will result in noisy (and often useless) data since
there exist other tasks in the system that also use the cache.
In contrast, knowing when the task is scheduled to run allows
the attacker to execute prime and probe attacks [17], [18] very
close to the targeted task’s execution.
Implementation: This attack is implemented in a hardware-
in-the-loop (HIL) simulation with a Zedboard running
FreeRTOS that simulates the control system on a UAV. The
system consists of an image processing task (the victim task,
pv = 33ms) handling photos at a rate of 30Hz and four other
tasks (unknown to the attacker) – all running in a periodic
fashion. The victim task processes a large size of data when the
UAV reaches a location of interest on a preloaded list. Other
tasks consume differing amounts of memory. In this case,
we assume that the attacker enters the system as the lowest-
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priority periodic task, po = 40ms. The attacker uses this task
for both running the ScheduLeak algorithms and carrying out
the cache-timing side-channel attack. The attacker’s final goal
is to observe the victim task’s memory usage and learn the
system behavior.
Attack Results: First, we consider an attacker who does
not employ a ScheduLeak attack. The attacker launches the
cache-timing side-channel attack during every period to try
and estimate the cache usage of the victim. As shown in
Figure 6(a), this produces many cache probes and it is hard
to distinguish the cache usage of the victim task from other
tasks. This results in an unsuccessful attack since no usage
patterns from the victim task can be identified.
Next, let’s consider the case in which the attacker leverages
the ScheduLeak attack. In this case, the algorithms yield
an inference precision ratio of 0.99 within a window of
3 · LCM(po, pv) (i.e., 4 seconds). Then, the attacker is able
to launch the cache-timing side-channel attack right before
and after the victim is executed and skip those instants that
are irrelevant. Figure 6(b) shows the result of the precise
cache probe against the victim task. We see that the attack
greatly reduces the noise caused by other tasks (96.9% of the
cache probes are omitted) and is able to precisely identify the
victim task’s memory usage behavior. As a result, four camera
activation instants can be identified from the spikes (red
triangular points) shown in Figure 6(b). When coupled with
the flight route information that the attacker obtains through
other measures, it becomes possible to infer the locations of
high-interest, as shown in Figure 6(c).
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
AND DESIGN SPACE EXPLORATION
A. Evaluation Setup
We test our algorithms with randomly generated synthetic
task sets. The task sets are grouped by CPU utilization from
[0.001+0.1 ·x, 0.1+0.1 ·x] where 0 ≤ x ≤ 9. Each utilization
group consists of 6 subgroups that have a fixed number of tasks
(5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15). Each subgroup contains 100 task sets. In
each task set, 50% of the tasks are generated as periodic tasks
(3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 periodic tasks for each subgroup respectively)
while the rest of the tasks are generated as sporadic tasks.
The task periods are randomly drawn from [100, 1000] and
we assume that the attacker has access to the system time
with a resolution of 1. The task initial offset is randomly
selected from [0, pi). In the case of sporadic tasks, we take the
generated task period as the minimum inter-arrival time. The
task priorities are assigned using the rate-monotonic algorithm
[5]. We only pick those task sets that are schedulable.
The observer task and the victim task are assigned when
generating the task sets. In simulations, we consider a periodic
observer task because it represents the worst case attack
scenario for the adversary, as discussed in Section IV-A. Since
only the tasks with higher priorities influence the observations,
we skip the generation of lower-priority tasks lp(τo). Thus, the
observer task always has the lowest priority (i.e., prio = 1) in
these generated task sets. For the victim task, two conditions
are considered: (i) priv = 2 and (ii) priv = |hp(τo)|. This is to
test the two boundary conditions. Further, we set the coverage
ratio to be C(τo, τv) ≥ 1 when generating the task sets (except
for evaluating the impact of the coverage ratio), to evaluate
whether the algorithms can truly produce confident inferences
while the attacker has theoretical guarantees of the attack
capability (i.e., having full coverage of all pv time columns,
as per Theorem 2). The maximum construction duration λ is
set as per Section IV-B. Thus, λ = GCD(po, pv).
For varying the execution times of the tasks and adding
jitter to the inter-arrival times (for the sporadic tasks), we
use the normal and Poisson distributions respectively. Note
that Poisson distribution is used for inter-arrival time variation
because the probability of each occurrence (i.e., each arrival
of the sporadic task) is independent in such a distribution
model. First, a schedulable task set is generated (using the
aforementioned parameters). Then, for a task τi, the average
execution time is computed by wceti · 80%. Next, we fit a
normal distribution N (µ, σ2) for the task τi. We let the mean
value µ be wceti ·80% and find the standard deviation σ with
which the cumulative probability P (X ≤ wceti) is 99.99%.
As a result, such a normal distribution produces variation such
that 95% of the execution times are within ±10% ·wceti. To
ensure that the task set remains schedulable, we adjust the
maximum modified execution time to be equal to WCET if
it exceeds WCET. For sporadic tasks, the average inter-arrival
time is computed by pi · 120%. We use a Poisson distribution
with pi · 120% as its mean value to generate the varied inter-
arrival times during the simulation. Similarly, so as to not
violate the given minimum inter-arrival time for a sporadic
task, we regenerate the modified inter-arrival time if it drops
below pi.
B. Results
1) Attack Duration: Our first goal is to understand the
effects of how long attacks last. Recall that the coverage
of the schedule ladder diagram repeats every LCM(po, pv)
(Observation 2). Therefore, we use LCM(po, pv) as the unit of
time to evaluate the algorithms. Taking the Ardupilot software
as an example, the largest LCM of any real-time task (i.e., a
AP HAL thread) pairs is 20ms. While LCM(po, pv) varies
system to system, this gives us an insight into the scale of
LCM(po, pv). In this experiment, we generate task sets as
explained in Section VII-A and run the ScheduLeak algorithms
with a fixed duration of 10 · LCM(po, pv) for every task set.
Figure 7 shows the results of this experiment. In Figure 7,
each point of the inference precision ratio is the mean of the
individual inference precision ratios of 12000 task sets for
a given attack duration. The results suggest that the longer
the attack is sustained, the higher success rate and precision
ratio the algorithms can achieve. This is because a longer
attack time means more execution intervals are reconstructed
by the observer task. On the other hand, both success rate
and precision ratio plateau after 5 · LCM(po, pv) with the
success rate and the precision ratio higher than 97% and
0.99 respectively. This shows that the proposed algorithms can
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Figure 7: The results of varying attack
duration. It indicates that longer attack
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cess and yield better inference precision.
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Figure 11: The impact of the victim task’s position in a task set. It suggests that a
victim task with higher priority makes it hard for the algorithms to make a correct
inference. This result stands throughout different number of tasks in a task set as
well as different task set utilization. Also, a high priority victim task with low task set
utilization reduces the inference performance. This explains the huge drop in Figure 10.
produce inference with precision in a very short time and the
additional gains obtained from running longer are minuscule.
For this reason, we evaluate the algorithms with a duration of
10 · LCM(po, pv) for the rest of the experiments below.
2) The Number of Tasks and Task Set Utilization: Fig-
ure 10 displays a 3D graph that shows the averaged inference
precision ratio for each combination of the number of tasks
and the task utilization subgroup. The results suggest that
(i) the inference precision ratio decreases as the number of
tasks in a task set increases and (ii) the inference precision
ratio increases as the task set utilization increases. The worst
inference precision ratio happens when there are 15 tasks
in a task set with the utilization group [0.001, 0.1] – these
are boundary conditions for both the number tasks and the
utilization in this experiment. The impact of the number of
tasks is straightforward as having more tasks in hp(τo) means
that τo will be preempted more frequently. This makes it hard
for the observer task to eliminate the false time columns.
For the impact of the task set utilization, a low utilization
value implies that the execution times of the tasks are small
and there exists a lot of gaps in the schedule. Hence, the
observer may get many small and scattered intervals. Since
we let the algorithms pick the largest interval to infer the
true arrival column, multiple small intervals are problematic
– the algorithm has a hard time picking the right interval that
contains the true arrival. Hence errors are compounded.
3) Priority of the Victim Task: We analyze the impact of
the victim task’s priority in a task set. From Section VII-A,
we consider two boundary conditions for the victim task’s
position: (i) priv = 2 and (ii) priv = |hp(τo)|. Figures 11(a)
and 11(b) present the experiment results for the two conditions.
Figure 11(a) shows that the huge drop in Figure 10 (as the
number of tasks increases) is mainly caused by the condition
priv = |hp(τo)|. Figure 11(b) also shows the similar indication
that the drop in low utilization groups in Figure 10 is a result
of the condition priv = |hp(τo)|. It’s worth noting that, since
we use the rate-monotonic algorithm to assign the priority,
priv = 2 means that τv has a large period, hence potentially
has greater execution time. It benefits the algorithms as we
pick the largest interval to make an inference in the final step.
4) Sporadic and Periodic Tasks: We examine the impact
of the mix of sporadic and periodic tasks. We generate task
sets with 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% sporadic tasks in a
task set. The rest of the tasks in a task set are periodic tasks.
Comparing the result of all periodic tasks and the result of all
sporadic tasks shown in Figure 8, we find that the algorithms
perform better with more sporadic tasks. It shows an ascending
trend as the proportion of sporadic tasks increases. However,
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the change in the performance is less than 1%, which is subtle.
Hence, our inference algorithms are fairly agnostic to the
actual mix of sporadic/periodic tasks in the system.
5) Coverage Ratio and The Maximum Reconstruction Du-
ration: The experiments above show that the algorithms
can reach certain inference success rates and precision when
C(τo, τv) ≥ 1 and λ = GCD(po, pv). However, attackers
may face a victim system where C(τo, τv) < 1. That is,
the observer task’s execution is not guaranteed to appear in
all pv time columns. To evaluate the performance of the
algorithms against such a case, we generate task sets with
0 < C(τo, τv) < 1 (thus λ = eo) and run the algorithms for a
duration of 10 ·LCM(po, pv). In this experiment, task sets are
grouped by coverage ratio from [0.001 + 0.1 · x, 0.1 + 0.1 · x]
where 0 ≤ x ≤ 9. Figure 9 shows the results. It suggests
that the attacker may fail to completely infer the victim task’s
initial offset when the coverage ratio is low. Yet, the algorithms
can still succeed in some cases due to the fact that Theorem 1
holds even with a low coverage ratio. When the observer
has about half coverage of the time columns (the group of
[0.401, 0.5]), it yields 59.9% in success rate and 0.819 for
the averaged inference precision ratio. As more time columns
are observed by the observer task, the precision and success
rate increase. This is because higher coverage ratios give the
algorithms a higher chance to capture the true arrival column
and remove others. As a result, the inference success rate is
about proportional to the coverage ratio.
VIII. DISCUSSION – POTENTIAL DEFENSE STRATEGIES
To defend against the proposed attack algorithms, one
strategy could be to enforce a low coverage ratio between any
low priority task and the critical real-time task by adjusting the
task parameters. This reduces the attacker’s observability/ca-
pability (based on results from Section VII-B5). Furthermore,
carefully designing and employing a harmonic taskset may
also reduce ScheduLeak’s inference precision since it creates
multiple candidates in the last step of the algorithms. However,
any change in the task parameters must fulfill both real-
time requirements as well as the required performance. Thus,
changing the task parameters may not always be applicable
in real-time systems especially the legacy systems that are
already deployed.
Since the proposed algorithms rely on the repeating patterns
of the victim task, a potential countermeasure is to perturb the
periodicity of the system schedule. Yet, the measure will not
be trivial due to the real-time constraints of real-time tasks. A
careless solution can easily cause some real-time tasks to miss
their deadlines and lead to a system failure. A randomization
protocol for a rate-monotonic scheduler presented by Yoon
et al. [19] is a good attempt on removing the scheduler side-
channel for RTS. However, their work is not applicable in our
case because they only focus on the systems with all periodic
tasks while our work is feasible on the systems with both
periodic and sporadic tasks (which is the case in most real-
time control systems). Therefore, an effective solution would
need to consider covering both task types.
IX. RELATED WORK
The problem of information leakage via side-channels has
been well studied in the literature. For instance, it has been
shown that cache-based side-channels can be invaluable for
information leakage [20], [21], [17], [18]. With the advent
of multi-tenant public clouds, cache-based side-channels and
their defenses have received renewed interest (e.g., [22], [23],
[24], [25]). Other types of side-channels such as differential
power analysis [26], electromagnetic and frequency analysis
[27], [28] have also been studied. Our focus here is on
scheduler side-channels in real-time systems.
There has also been some work on information flow via
schedulers. The problem where two tasks leak private infor-
mation by using a covert channel is studied [2], [3]. Vo¨lp
et al. [1], [29] examined covert channels between different
priorities of real-time tasks and proposed solutions to avoid
such covert channels. The methodologies for quantifying in-
formation leakage in schedulers are also studied [30], [31].
While the previous works focused on covert channels in
some schedulers, our focus is on novel side-channels in real-
time schedulers where an unprivileged low-priority task can
infer the execution timing behaviors of high-priority real-
time task(s). Also, in contrast to covert channels that rely
on actively preempting real-time tasks, the side-channel in
our work does not violate any real-time constraints and the
observer task only observes its own behavior.
The integration of security into real-time schedulers is a
developing area of research. Mohan et al. [32] offered a
consideration of real-time system security requirements as a
set of scheduling constraints and introduced a modified fixed-
priority scheduling algorithm that integrates security levels
into scheduling decisions. Pellizzoni et al. [11] extended the
above scheme to a more general task model and also proposed
an optimal priority assignment method that determines the task
preemptibility. Some researchers also have focused on defense
techniques for real-time systems (e.g., [33], [34], [35], [36],
[37], [38], [39]). However, these solutions do not protect the
systems from the ScheduLeak attack.
The most closely related solution is to adopt a random-
ization technique to obfuscate the schedule. Yoon et al. [19]
introduced a randomization protocol for a preemptive, fixed-
priority scheduler that works with only (fully) periodic tasks.
Kru¨ger et al. [40] built upon this by proposing an online
job randomization algorithm for time-triggered systems. Nev-
ertheless, these solutions are not applicable to most real-
time systems in which a preemptive, fixed-priority scheduler
supports both periodic and sporadic real-time tasks. This
leaves those systems still vulnerable to our ScheduLeak attack.
X. CONCLUSION
Successful security breaches in control systems (including
cyber-physical systems) with real-time properties can have
catastrophic effects. In many such systems, knowledge of the
precise timing information of critical tasks could be beneficial
to adversaries. Our work in this paper demonstrates how to
capture this schedule timing information in a stealthy manner
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– i.e., without being detected or causing any perturbations to
the original system. Designers of such systems now need to
be cognizant of such attack vectors and design the system to
include countermeasures that can thwart potential intruders.
The end result is that real-time systems can be more robust to
security threats overall.
APPENDIX
A. Algorithm for Reconstructing An Execution Interval
Algorithm 1 Reconstructing An Execution Interval
E(eo, e′o, λ)
{GT : global timer (system timer)}
{eo : the worst case execution time of τo}
{e′o : remaining execution time of present job of τo}
{λ : maximum reconstruction duration in a period}
{tstop : stop time when λ is met}
{t0, t−1 : present and last time stamps}
{tbegin, tend : start, end time of the detected interval}
1: t0 = GT
2: tbegin = t0
3: tstop = tbegin + e
′
o − (eo − λ)
4: duration = 0
5: while duration ≤ loop execution time unit and t0 <
tstop do
6: t−1 = t0
7: t0 = GT
8: duration = t0 − t−1
9: end while
10: if duration > loop execution time unit then
11: tend = t−1
12: else
13: tend = t0
14: end if
15: e′o = e
′
o − (tend − tbegin)
16: return {tbegin, tend, e′o}
Algorithm 1 takes the observer task’s worst case execution
time eo, the remaining execution time of the present instance
e′o and the maximum reconstruction duration λ as inputs.
It outputs the start time tbegin and end time tend of the
detected execution interval as well as the updated remaining
execution time of the present instance e′o. Lines 1 –4 initialize
the variables to be used by the algorithm. Specifically, line
3 computes the point in time (the stop condition) when the
algorithm reaches the given maximum reconstruction duration
λ for the present instance. Lines 5 – 9 are used to detect a
preemption and check if current time exceeds the computed
stop time point. These lines keep track of the time difference
between each loop by reading present time from a global
timer (i.e., a system timer) and comparing it to the time from
the previous loop. If the time difference exceeds what we
anticipate (the execution time of the loop), we know that a
preemption occurred (i.e., one or more higher-priority tasks
executed). The loop exits either when a preemption is detected
or the present time exceeds the computed stop time point.
Lines 10 – 12 determine the end time of the reconstructing
execution interval. If the loop exits because of a preemption,
the last time point before the preemption is taken as the
end time of that execution interval (line 11). Otherwise, no
preemption is detected, all λ duration is used up and the latest
time point is taken as the end time of the execution interval
(line 13). Line 15 updates the remaining execution time of
the present job for the next invocation. Line 16 returns the
reconstructed execution interval (its start time tstart and end
time tend) and the updated remaining execution time.
B. Schedule on A Schedule Ladder Diagram
To better understand the effectiveness of the schedule ladder
diagram in profiling the victim task’s behavior, we plot the
original schedule of Example 1 on the ladder diagram in
Figure 12 so that readers get a better sense of it. This is not
a part of our algorithms, but it gives us an insight into the
correlation of the behaviors between the observer task and the
victim task.
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Figure 12: The schedule of the task set in Example 1 plotted
on a schedule ladder diagram with a width of pv . It shows that
time columns [1, 3) are always occupied by either the victim
task or other higher priority tasks. Therefore, the execution
intervals of the observer task will not land on these time
columns where the true arrival column is enclosed. This fact
is what the proposed algorithms is based on.
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